Quantum threat assessment

What breaks, and what to fix first.

We find the cryptography that quantum computers will break, rank it by how long your data must stay secret, and give you a migration plan, with a signed record of how the inventory and the plan were produced.

Every assessment runs only against systems you authorize in writing. We scope to systems, never to individuals, and nothing is scanned before the engagement is signed.

Book an assessment See a sample deliverable

A financial entity in the EU? How each part maps to DORA’s technical standard · Also: healthcare in Latin America, software sold to banks in Brazil

What you receive

Four parts, each one sealed.

01SEALED

An inventory of your cryptography

An automated scan of the code and dependency manifests you give us access to. Every finding records the file and line where it was seen. Systems we cannot scan are listed from what you tell us, and marked as such.

02SEALED

An exposure ranking

Every asset tested with one inequality, X plus Y against Z: how long its data must stay secret, plus how long its migration takes, against the horizon you plan for. You supply X and Y where you know them; where we assumed, the assumption is sealed with the ranking.

03SEALED

A migration plan

The replacement for each asset: a NIST post-quantum standard for public-key cryptography, a stronger classical algorithm where that is the fix, and a question back to you where the scan cannot tell how a key is used. Ordered phases, with a way back at each one. Nothing is marked done until it is.

04SEALED

The evidence file

The inventory, the ranking and the plan as linked, signed receipts in one file, together with each of them and the inputs they were built from. Your auditor checks it with our free checker, offline, without asking us.

Sealed means the step is written into a signed receipt linked to the one before it, so any later edit to that step shows, and each step must have been built from the same inventory. How the receipts work · The free checker

The parts, on a real project

Our assessment of paramiko 5.0.0, an open-source SSH library, not a client. Click through the inventory and the plan, check the evidence file in your browser, then hide a finding and watch the check fail.

Findings111in 41 files

Must move77by the published rule

Weak classically43DES and MD5 and SHA1; depends on the use

Plan steps13in a safe order

Every use of cryptography our scanner found in the source (41files read), including algorithms the code offers by name, each with its file and line. A scan of source has gaps: it can miss dependencies, compiled code and choices made at runtime. Each finding is ranked by one published rule (Mosca's): if what it protects must stay secret for X = 12 years, and moving off it takes Y = 3 years, then X + Y = 15 years is longer than the Z = 10-year horizon we plan against, so it has to move now. Change those numbers and the ranking changes; they are sealed in the record.

Algorithm	Where	Ranking	Why
3DES	transport.py:263	Weak classically	Weak without a quantum computer (MD5 and SHA-1 against collisions, 3DES, DES and other 64-bit-block ciphers by their block size, RC4 outright). Whether that matters depends on the use; replace it where the format allows, whatever the horizon.
3DES	transport.py:182	Weak classically	Weak without a quantum computer (MD5 and SHA-1 against collisions, 3DES, DES and other 64-bit-block ciphers by their block size, RC4 outright). Whether that matters depends on the use; replace it where the format allows, whatever the horizon.
MD5	pkey.py:390	Weak classically	Weak without a quantum computer (MD5 and SHA-1 against collisions, 3DES, DES and other 64-bit-block ciphers by their block size, RC4 outright). Whether that matters depends on the use; replace it where the format allows, whatever the horizon.
SHA1	config.py:449	Weak classically	Weak without a quantum computer (MD5 and SHA-1 against collisions, 3DES, DES and other 64-bit-block ciphers by their block size, RC4 outright). Whether that matters depends on the use; replace it where the format allows, whatever the horizon.
DH	transport.py:324	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	kex_group16.py:35	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	kex_group16.py:30	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	kex_group14.py:45	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	transport.py:325	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	transport.py:219	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	transport.py:218	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	transport.py:220	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	kex_gex.py:51	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
DH	transport.py:326	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
EC	ecdsakey.py:167	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:113	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	ecdsakey.py:254	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	ecdsakey.py:224	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	ecdsakey.py:268	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	ecdsakey.py:305	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:151	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:67	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	ecdsakey.py:242	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:71	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:145	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:117	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:23	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
EC	kex_ecdh_nist.py:59	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
ECDH	kex_ecdh_nist.py:143	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:327	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	kex_ecdh_nist.py:21	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:329	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:216	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:215	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:328	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	kex_ecdh_nist.py:149	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDH	transport.py:217	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
ECDSA	transport.py:201	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:208	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:313	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:199	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:210	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:315	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:317	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:200	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ECDSA	transport.py:209	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ED25519	transport.py:198	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ED25519	transport.py:207	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ED25519	ed25519key.py:42	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
ED25519	transport.py:319	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	rsakey.py:43	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	rsakey.py:211	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	agent.py:53	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	rsakey.py:210	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	transport.py:791	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:203	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	client.py:431	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	rsakey.py:41	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	transport.py:1317	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	agent.py:54	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:1318	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	rsakey.py:78	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	transport.py:211	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:790	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	client.py:432	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	client.py:433	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:311	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:212	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	rsakey.py:45	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	transport.py:309	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	client.py:434	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	transport.py:202	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	client.py:430	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists. The scanner did not determine how this key is used, so it takes the stricter case: the harvestable case, where recorded traffic is exposed.
RSA	rsakey.py:184	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
RSA	rsakey.py:89	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Nothing can be harvested from a signature, but once the capability exists the key can be forged; X is how long the key must still be trusted.
X25519	transport.py:223	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
X25519	kex_curve25519.py:109	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
X25519	kex_curve25519.py:45	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
X25519	kex_curve25519.py:30	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
X25519	transport.py:332	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
X25519	kex_curve25519.py:71	Act now	X plus Y exceeds Z by 5 years. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.
AES	transport.py:177	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:251	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:178	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:179	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:227	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:257	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	pkey.py:727	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	pkey.py:691	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:233	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:176	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:239	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	pkey.py:693	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:181	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:245	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
AES	transport.py:180	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:188	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:192	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:287	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	packet.py:47	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:292	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:194	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:191	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:288	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:290	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:293	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:286	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:193	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	hostkeys.py:300	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
HMAC	transport.py:187	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.
SHA256	pkey.py:401	Safe for this horizon	Symmetric key or hash; the known quantum attack (Grover) gives only a square-root speedup. Not a migration target.

The one test

X plus Y against Z.

Michele Mosca’s inequality, as NIST IR 8547 presents it: if the years your data must stay secret (X) plus the years your migration takes (Y) add up to more than the years until a quantum computer can break the cryptography (Z), that data is already exposed.

X · SHELF LIFE

How long the data must stay secret. Your retention policy decides it.

Y · MIGRATION TIME

How long replacing the cryptography on that system takes. Your engineers estimate it; we check it against the inventory.

Z · HORIZON

Nobody knows it. An expert survey puts the chance at 28 to 49% within ten years, so we plan against ten by default and you can choose another.

Probability bands from the Global Risk Institute Quantum Threat Timeline Report 2025 (Mosca and Piani, published March 2026, 26 experts surveyed). Deadlines from US Executive Order 14412, the EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap, and NIST IR 8547, which is still a draft. Each binds different organizations.

What the asset uses

No retention policy? Start from our assumption for a sector:

X, shelf life: 10 yearshow long it must stay secret or trusted

Y, migration time: 3 yearshow long replacing it takes

Z, horizon: 10 yearswe plan against 10 by default

HIGH

X plus Y exceeds Z by 3 years, with little slack. Anything copied today can be read once the capability exists.

Bar: solid is X, faint is Y, the gold line is Z. Nothing you enter leaves this page.

The full exposure tool, for a list of assets

Exposure tiers

Every exposed asset gets one of four answers.

The same rules as the free exposure tool, so you can recompute any tier we give you. An asset already on a NIST post-quantum standard is marked MIGRATED instead.

CRITICAL

X plus Y exceeds Z by five years or more

Data copied today is still valuable when the capability is expected to exist. Migrate first.

HIGH

X plus Y exceeds Z by less than five years

Exposed, with little slack.

MONITOR

X plus Y within three years of Z, or a 128-bit symmetric key

Not exposed on these values, but a longer retention or a slower migration would flip it.

SAFE

Comfortably inside Z, or strong symmetric cryptography

Not a migration target on the values given.

Our starting assumptions

If you have no retention policy, we start here.

These shelf lives are our planning assumptions, not legal requirements. Your own retention policy replaces them, and the report says which values were yours and which were ours.

Defense

35 yrs

Classified programs, communications security

Insurance

30 yrs

Long-tail claims and reserves

Healthcare

30 yrs

Medical records over a patient lifetime

Banking

25 yrs

Customer and transaction records

Pharma

25 yrs

Compound IP and clinical data

Government

25 yrs

Records under classification holds

Energy

20 yrs

Grid topology and safety systems

Legal

20 yrs

Privileged communications and litigation

Telecom

15 yrs

Subscriber data and signaling

Manufacturing

15 yrs

Trade secrets and designs

Technology

10 yrs

Product roadmaps and source code

Frameworks we map to

The documents your auditor will cite.

The plan references the framework each recommendation answers to. Each link goes to the issuing authority’s own page.

NSA · USCNSA 2.0

CISA · USQuantum-Readiness

OMB · USM-23-02

NIST · USIR 8547

NIST · USSP 800-227

ENISA · EUPQC Guidance

DORA · EUArticle 6 · ICT Risk

ETSI · EUQuantum-Safe Crypto

SWIFT · GlobalCSP / CSCF

BSI · DEMigration to PQC

Timing

Our target is 72 hours from access.

From receiving access to the code in scope to delivering the four parts above. The first engagements will show whether that target holds, and we will say so either way. Scope and terms are agreed in conversation before anything starts.

Book an assessment See a sample deliverable