Government and critical infrastructure in the EU
NIS2 asks for cryptography that is state of the art. That standard moves.
A substation, a water utility or a central government network bought today will still be running in the 2040s, and the key exchange protecting its traffic is negotiated now. NIS2 does not name quantum computing. It requires measures that take the state of the art into account, a policy on the use of cryptography, and a procedure for assessing whether those measures still work, which is where an ageing algorithm shows up.
Member States have applied NIS2 measures since 18 October 2024 (Article 41). NIS2 on EUR-Lex
What the rules say
Four sentences from the directive.
“Taking into account the state-of-the-art and, where applicable, relevant European and international standards, as well as the cost of implementation, the measures referred to in the first subparagraph shall ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risks posed”
The benchmark is the state of the art, which moves, rather than a fixed checklist.
Read the source“policies and procedures regarding the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption”
A policy on the use of cryptography is one of the minimum measures, not an optional extra.
Read the source“policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of cybersecurity risk-management measures”
You have to check whether your measures still work. An algorithm losing its margin is that kind of finding.
Read the source“supply chain security, including security-related aspects concerning the relationships between each entity and its direct suppliers or service providers”
The cryptography your suppliers ship is in scope too, which is how this reaches the vendors of grid and government systems.
Read the sourceNIS2 is a directive, so what binds an operator is the national law that transposes it. Article 41 required Member States to adopt and publish those measures by 17 October 2024 and to apply them from 18 October 2024. Transposition has run late in several Member States, and the national text is the one to read. Article 41
Annex I lists the sectors. Public administration entities of central governments are in scope as defined by each Member State in national law, alongside energy, transport, water and digital infrastructure. Entities whose activities are predominantly national security, defence or law enforcement are excluded. Annex I and the exclusion
The directive never mentions quantum computing. The EU post-quantum roadmap is what connects the two: it cites NIS2, alongside DORA, as a rule that already requires state-of-the-art cryptography. The roadmap
The dates
EU Coordinated Implementation Roadmap.
Issued 23 June 2025. A recommendation to EU Member States, not a law that binds a firm directly. It cites DORA and NIS2 as rules that already require state-of-the-art cryptography.
What an assessment gives you
Each part, against what it serves.
The inventory: the cryptography found in the code and dependency manifests you give us, each finding with the file and line where it was seen. It is what a policy has to be written against. Cryptography inside appliances and field devices we cannot scan comes from you, and is marked as such.
The exposure ranking and the migration plan: which public-key uses a quantum computer breaks, ordered by how long the traffic or the records they protect must stay secret, which for grid and government assets is usually longer than the equipment lifetime.
The evidence file: the inventory, the ranking and the plan as linked, signed records, with the assumptions behind the ranking sealed in, so a later assessment can be compared against this one rather than repeated from memory.
What this is not
- This is not a NIS2 compliance certification, and it is not legal advice. What binds you is your Member State transposition, and whether you comply is for you and your competent authority.
- NIS2 sets no post-quantum deadline. The dates above come from the EU roadmap, which is a recommendation to Member States.
- The assessment covers the systems you put in scope. Operational technology we are not shown, and cryptography embedded in devices we cannot read, is not in the inventory.
- We do not test, probe or scan a live network. The inventory is read from the code and manifests you provide.
Next
See what the deliverable looks like.
The sample is a made-up Spanish bank rather than a utility, so read it for the method: an inventory, a ranking by how long data must stay secret, and a plan.
Quotations read from EUR-Lex on 23 September 2026.